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Abstract 
The predictive ability of scholars of politics has long been a subject of theoretical debate and 
methodological development. In theoretical debate, prediction represents a central issue regarding 
the extent to which the study of politics is scientific. In methodological development, much effort 
and resource has been devoted to a diverse range of predictive approaches, with varying degrees of 
success. Expectations that scholars forecast accurately come as much from the policy and media 
worlds as from the academy. Since the end of the Cold War, scenario development has become 
prevalent in future-oriented research by area studies scholars. This approach is long due critical re-
assessment. For all its strengths as a policy tool, scenario development tends towards a bounded 
methodology, driving the process of anticipating futures along predetermined paths into a 
standardised range of options, and paying insufficient attention to theoretical and contextual 
understandings available within the relevant scholarly disciplines. 
 
Key Words: area studies, forecasts, scenarios, methods, policy. 
 
 
‘Forecasts go wrong because forecasting is so difficult ... According to 
one school of thought, the likelihood of error is so great that no 
respectable person would become involved. On this view, academics 
should stay well away from the future – rather as, until recently, they 
were advised to stay away from the present. This view is quite 
untenable’ (Cooper and Layard, 2002).  
The argument that scholars and analysts have no business dabbling in forecasts stands 
precariously when set against the questions asked of area studies specialists should their 
expertise be sought by governments, business, and the media. Experts in a particular area 
are expected to be adept at essaying likely future developments. To the researcher, future-
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oriented analysis represents an important means of demonstrating the value of their work, 
particularly in a funding context where the externally validated approval of the relevance of 
academic research is becoming an ever more pertinent concern. From an epistemological 
perspective, however, forecasting is problematic, touching as it does on the claims which 
social science makes regarding its predictive ability. 
From the perspective of political science in particular, the question of prediction stands at 
the centre of debates around the discipline’s essential nature. For many observers the key 
distinction between natural and social sciences lies precisely in the area of prediction. 
Milton Friedman asserted more than half a century ago that ‘the only relevant test of the 
validity of a hypothesis is comparison of its predictions with experience’ (Friedman, 1953: 7-
8). Bent Flyvbjerg’s rejection of the naturalistic model for political science likewise sets up 
predictive ability as the key differential between the natural and the social sciences. He calls 
for ‘a social science that matters’, taking what he generalises as a sterile and isolated 
activity undertaken mostly for its own sake, and transforming it into an activity done in 
public, for the public, which provides insight into present and future, but not formal theory-
based prediction (Flyvbjerg, 2001: 39). Other scholars offer a more optimistic evaluation of 
the accuracy of predictive models and theories, arguing, for example, that the scientific 
approach to international relations is well able to produce accurate predictions (Bueno de 
Mesquita, 1998, 2011; Ray and Russett, 1996: 467).  
Against this background of expectation, epistemological debate, and analytical complexity, 
the scenario approach has, for the last two decades in particular, become a commonly used 
tool in area studies. Scenario planning ostensibly side-steps the debate over the relationship 
between social science and predictive theory by declaring that it does not offer prediction or 
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forecast, but rather a number of potential futures, each of which is possible depending on 
the behaviour and significance of the key drivers in play. The movement of scenarios from 
management literature into the social science and policy mainstream from the 1990s 
onwards coincided with, and complemented, the postmodern turn of the immediate post-
Cold War era. Where all-encompassing metanarratives had been brought low, scenario 
planning offered a choice of narratives. Where political scientists and IR scholars had been 
widely criticised for failing to predict the collapse of the Soviet bloc and the end of the Cold 
War (Cox, 1998; Ray and Russett, 1996; Seliktar, 2004), scenario planning required the 
presentation of a range of futures, from straightforward continuity to that ubiquitous 
emblem of the scenario methodology, ‘thinking the unthinkable’ (Bishop et al., 2007: 11; 
Bradfield et al., 2005: 798; Kahn, 1962; Yergin and Gustafson, 1993: 10). Where, in the 
Anglo-Saxon world at least, the idea gained ground that universities needed to connect 
more with and learn more from the world of business and commerce, academics took the 
scenario planning approach pioneered by the Shell oil company in the 1970s and 1980s and 
applied it to both academic and policy work (Sylvan et al., 2004).  
This article critiques the use of scenarios in future-oriented area studies research against the 
criteria which the scenario approach sets for itself, and in the light of the broader literature 
on the relationship between political science and forecasting. The literature on scenario 
development in the field of area studies has been markedly positive, unsurprisingly so given 
that most has been written by those who have adopted the method. I argue, however, that 
the scenario approach serves best when used normatively, tasked not simply with imagining 
futures, but rather with shaping and developing policy responses to it. Where, as is common 
in many scenario-based accounts of different countries, their use has not been normative, 
then the scenario method has served as ‘something of a cop-out’ (Smith, 1997: 2), blurring 
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the distinction between prediction and planning. Scenario analysis too often undermines its 
own apparent methodological rigour, offering self-contained narrative scenarios which belie 
claims to present complex interpretations superior to the linear predictions of earlier 
approaches. The results amount to a static and somewhat formulaic series of comparative 
case-studies; fictional futures constructed according to the imagined behaviour of different 
variables. I begin by surveying recent literature on the possibilities and pit-falls of prediction 
in political science, before turning in more detail to the rise of the scenario. 
 
Future-oriented social science 
Charles Taylor, amongst others, has argued that context and interpretation constitute so 
crucial a part of political action that the notion of abstract models consistently and 
accurately predicting political behaviour remains problematic, since ‘narrowly scientific, 
reductive approaches to the human world always prove “terribly implausible”’ (Rogers, 
2008). Such a stance stems from the position that societies and polities do not operate 
according to stable calculable rules. Similarly, Bent Flyvbjerg’s view is that intuition and 
context play such a key role for political actors as to render rule-based accounts of actions 
inadequate. He argues, on this basis, that the key differential between the social and the 
natural sciences lies in the former’s inability to match the latter’s predictive ability 
(Flyvbjerg, 2001). David Laitin, in a sharp critique of Flyvbjerg’s thesis, contends that 
accurate prediction does not represent a ‘necessary component of science’, unless ‘what is 
meant is meant by prediction is the ability of scholars in the field to make reasonably good 
probability estimates of individual behaviour’. This, Laitin argues, social scientists have long 
been able to do (Laitin, 2005: 120). 
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Broadly speaking, the successes of theoretical modelling are most notable when considering 
single policy outcomes within a relatively constrained timescale such as, for example, Bueno 
de Mesquita’s lauded prediction of the Iranian succession in the 1980s (Bueno de Mesquita, 
1984). Moving beyond individual or dyadic cases to the systemic level reduces predictive 
ability (James, 1995: 187). Similarly, in articles specifically addressing the question of 
prediction, strong cases have been made for the broad predictive force of some 
International Relations theories, such as democratic peace theory (Ray and Russett, 1996: 
458-464), power cycle theory (Doran, 1999), and the geopolitical theory of state power 
(Collins, 1995). In these cases, however, the authors have been careful to point out the 
limitations of prediction. The theories concerned operate at the general rather than the 
specific level. Returning to the demand from policy-makers for accurate forecasting, Ray and 
Russett caution against being too ready to make the jump from generalising to strong policy 
recommendation (1996: 465). Doran similarly argues that for predictions to be politically 
useful, they require precision. Citing the Washington adage that ‘to be right at the wrong 
time is to be wrong’, he notes that although power cycle theory might confidently predict a 
shift in the relative power of a state, and provide an explanation as to why this will happen, 
it cannot say precisely when it will happen.  
Neither side in this debate argues that the social sciences have the scientific capability to 
provide mechanistic predictions in all circumstances. Questions of precision and scale are 
crucial. Contributors to a symposium on the possibility of prediction in the social sciences – 
sparked, as much of the literature in this field is, by the largely unanticipated collapse of the 
Soviet system – appeared to represent the range of views for and against as set out above 
(Collins, 1995; Kuran, 1995; Tilly, 1995). However, as Edgar Kiser pointed out in his 
comments on the symposium’s findings, apparently opposing positions appear less at odds 
Comparing Political Futures 
with each other when crucial questions of precision and scale are considered (Kiser, 1995: 
1611-1612). Randall Collins’ argument that theory-based prediction occurs successfully in 
the social sciences, carried with it the caveat that the range of temporal precision for 
macropolitical prediction ought to be measured in decades (Collins, 1995: 1552). In other 
words, large-scale political processes, such as at the level of countries or international 
systems, do not readily lend themselves to invariant closed-system modelling since they 
have a huge number of variables with great complexity in the relations between them (Tilly, 
1995: 1594).  
The broader the field of future vision, the more complex, difficult, and prone to 
generalisation forecasts become. As many writers on the predictive possibilities of political 
science point out (Cooper and Layard, 2002: 5; Doran, 1999: 11-13), the most basic 
predictions involve linearity and continuity, along the lines of, what is happening today will 
happen tomorrow, if it is happening more today than it was yesterday, then it is likely to 
happen even more tomorrow and the day after tomorrow. Forecasts are more reliable 
when focused on fields of study less prone to short-term instability. All fields of endeavour 
contain limitations within which to make forecasts, but in some fields harder limitations 
predominate and in others softer. For example, climate and lack of transport infrastructure 
represent relatively hard limits on the prospects for resource development in India. We 
know roughly when the rains will come and how long they will last. We can gauge relatively 
accurately the length of time necessary to construct a road. Whatever the surrounding 
circumstances, nothing much will change these facts. The limits on political developments 
on the other hand are softer. An apparently stable superpower can collapse with rapidity, 
leading political figures can be assassinated, and so on. In his pioneering methodological 
overview of predictive studies in the social sciences, Daniel Bell utilised the distinction made 
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by William Graham Sumner between crescive changes (those which follow largely 
autonomous processes) and enacted changes (those which stem from the less predictable 
moves of political actors), arguing that ‘sociological analysis is more sure when it deals with 
crescive changes’ such as demographic cycles, and broad societal developments (Bell, 1958: 
358). 
A related refinement to our conceptualisation of future-oriented analysis relates to opacity. 
Here the oft-maligned Rumsfeldian terminology provides a useful illustration. At a press 
briefing in 2002, US Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, said: 
There are known knowns; there are things we know we know. We also know there are 
known unknowns; that is to say we know there are some things we do not know. But 
there are also unknown unknowns – the ones we don't know we don't know. 
In the triumvirate of known knowns, known unknowns, and unknown unknowns, known 
unknowns constitute the pivotal category in terms of forecasting. By definition, known 
knowns bring factual certainty on which we construct forecasts. Similarly, by definition, 
unknown unknowns can scarcely be factored in, except as a caution that some 
unforeseeable variable might undermine almost any forecast. Even imaginable wildcards, 
such as assassinations and earthquakes, might be anticipated in gaming or, as discussed 
later, scenario planning, but rarely can they be forecast. Known unknowns, however, are 
those factors which forecasters can identify as important variables, but about which they 
possess insufficient information. The greater the opacity of a socio-political system, the 
more known unknowns exist. In an open socio-political system, pollsters publish accurate 
public opinion surveys, newspapers report political intrigue, and independent statistical 
agencies reveal socio-economic data. In a more closed or opaque system, the state might 
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control, cover up, or distort such information, making the task of the forecaster more 
difficult and more reliant on contextual knowledge and intuition.  
Slavoj Žižek adds to Rumsfeld’s triumvirate the missing but logical fourth variant – unknown 
knowns; in other words, those disavowed beliefs and suppositions which ‘we pretend not to 
know about, even though they form the background of our public values’ (Žižek, 2004). 
Although not stated in these terms, the central argument of Ofira Seliktar’s book-length 
answer to the question ‘why did so few predict the collapse of the Soviet Union?’ is that 
‘unknown knowns’ inhibited scholarly visions of future possibilities for the Soviet Union. In 
other words, a lack of awareness of, or refusal to acknowledge and question, the dominant 
paradigms within which forecasts were made, meant that those forecasts contained 
restricted conceptualisations of possible outcomes, and, in the Soviet case, failed to allow 
for the possibility of collapse (Seliktar, 2004: 5).  
Returning to the question of the relationship between policy-makers and political scientists 
when it comes to future-oriented analysis, two further issues arise which affect the nature 
of that analysis. The first concerns timescales. Broadly speaking, short-term forecasts are 
more reliable than long-term forecasts, since as the tendencies towards an outcome 
develop, then analysts more easily see their likely outworking. The trumpeting of particular 
predictions as remarkable in their foresight should generally be checked against the 
temporal distance between prediction and event. Roger Boesche’s lauding of de 
Tocqueville’s ‘astonishing’ record of foretelling is undermined a little by the realisation that 
his ‘most dramatic’ prediction, of the 1848 revolution in France, was delivered in 1848 
(Boesche, 1983: 79). 
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The link between confidence in forecasting and distance of projection into the future is not, 
however, as linear as might be expected when it comes to the impact of the forecast on 
both the actions of the policy-maker and the reputation of the analyst. Consider medium 
and long-term forecasting. There is truth in the notion that the further away your 
prediction, the more confident you can appear, since, as Keynes had it, ‘in the long run we 
are all dead’ (Keynes, 1923: 80), forecasts will be forgotten, and their relevance minimal. 
Were I to construct a detailed long-term forecast setting out how China in 2100 will be an 
arid poverty-stricken militarised dictatorship or a thriving technologically advanced 
associative democracy, then despite the radical implications of either outcome, no 
government, business, or international organisation would alter their behaviour as a result 
of such a long-term prediction. On the other hand, policy-makers do commission medium-
term forecasts, projecting scenarios 10 to 20 years ahead, precisely in order to guide policy 
(European Commission Forward Studies Unit, 1997, 1998a, 1998b; Kuusi, Smith, and 
Tihonen, 2007). Medium-term forecasts represent a distinct task in comparison with short 
or long-term assessments. They situate their outcomes too far ahead to simply posit that 
simplest of all predictions – that today’s world will continue, with appropriate linear 
adjustments, into tomorrow – but not so far ahead to allow for a more reckless speculative 
liberty. 
The second issue of particular relevance to the relationship between forecasts and the 
policy world concerns purposive engagement with future events. Forecasts within the milieu 
of political science often contain a clear normative element. They may aim to influence 
policy choices by highlighting likely future trends, setting out a programme to follow in 
response to their forecast, or proselytising an aspirational vision of a future world. Such 
purposive engagement sets up the possibility of a self-fulfilling hypothesis, encouraging the 
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adoption of policies designed to confirm the forecast outcome (Bell, 1958: 364-65). In 
formal policy settings, of course, the tension between advocacy and objectivity is 
particularly acute.  
 
Scenario Planning 
From the late 1980s and early 1990s onwards, the use of multiple scenarios became 
increasingly prevalent in predictive writing in the field of area studies. A bibliographical 
search of the Web of Science Social Science Citation Index shows that from the end of the 
1980s the use of the scenario approach increased markedly. Figure One illustrates this sharp 
increase in academic social science articles with ‘scenario’ in the title. Analysis of these 
articles’ titles shows that much of this increase came in the fields of broad ‘futurology’, 
management, and energy studies. The lower line in Figure One, however, shows articles 
with ‘scenario’ and ‘political / politics’ in their abstract. Not only does this line indicate a 
similar increase from around 1990 onwards, but analysis of the titles of such articles (see 
Appendix One) shows that the scenario approach has been used widely in area studies for 
the past two decades. Appendix 1 lists 74 publications within area studies which develop 
future scenarios, with China, Europe, India, and Russia being prominent. 
 
 
 
Figure One. Bibliographical search of Web of Science Social Science Citation Index for 
articles with ‘scenarios’ in the title and ‘scenarios’ and ‘polit*’ in the abstract. 
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Source: Social Science Citation Index, Web of Science, 17 July 2011 
 
A vast literature exists on the use of scenarios. Most of it sits within the fields of 
management (Ringland, 2006; Schwartz, 1996; Van der Heijden, 2005) and interdisciplinary 
‘future studies’ – represented in such academic publications as Journal of Future Studies, 
Futures: the Journal of Policy, Planning and Futures Studies, and International Journal of 
Forecasting, as well as the latter’s more stylistically popular stable-mate Foresight: The 
International Journal of Applied Forecasting (Bishop et al., 2007; Bradfield et al., 2005). 
Much of this literature is made up of the discipline-specific; methodological outlines and 
case-studies for businesses undertaking their own scenario-planning exercises (Ringland, 
2006), or detailed analysis of the techniques for developing scenarios in future studies 
literature (Bishop et al., 2007; Miller, 2007). My concern here lies not with in-depth 
assessment of the literature on scenario studies, but specifically with the growth of and 
intepretations of scenario approaches within area studies forecasting. I engage with the 
wider scenarios literature only in relation to such forecasting. This engagement 
demonstrates that much of this scenario-based future-oriented political research amounts 
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to an adoption of the terms and tenets of the scenario technique, but with little in the way 
of deeper engagement with its literature or methodology, or with the literature on the 
nature of forecasting in political science set out in the first part of this article. 
Although the growth of scenario-based writing in the field of area studies from the late 
1980s and particularly the early 1990s onwards stems from the use of the technique in the 
world of business (Cornelius et al., 2005), its origins lie in the political forecasting of the 
early Cold War years. In the 1950s and 1960s, the US government poured resources into 
projecting the likely development of the world as the perceived threat of the Soviet Union 
and global Communism grew. Herman Kahn of the RAND Corporation – lauded as a genius 
by several observers (Aligica, 2007; Bishop et al., 2007: 11; Bradfield et al., 2005: 798; Bruce-
Briggs, 2000; Hurley, 1968; Kahn and Agel, 1973) – developed scenario planning from its 
original military use. Coterminous with, and drawing on, the development of computers and 
of game theory, Kahn and others began to apply scenario analysis increasingly to the 
political and economic sphere, most famously in the 1967 book The Year 2000, which, in 
keeping with the increasingly dominant Unity of Science paradigm of that era, preferred a 
mechanistic and quantitative approach, dominated by demographic and economic data, to 
any socially contextual interpretation of developments. In The Year 2000, Kahn developed 
the notion of scenarios, offering alternative futures based around relative continuity, or 
‘surprise free’, possibilities, complemented by ‘some less likely but important possibilities’ 
and ‘ten far-out possibilities’ (Kahn et al., 1967: 25, 55, 56). In the same volume, Kahn’s co-
author, Anthony J. Wiener, likewise instigated a common device in the scenario method by 
contributing a short story (Kahn et al., 1967: 352-356). Numerous examples of scenario-
based predictive writing in the political sphere have similarly employed the technique of 
scenario-based narratives, written as they might be found in some future history book 
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(European Commission Forward Studies Unit, 1998b; Ogilvy et al., 2000; Yergin and 
Gustafson, 1993). 
 For a few years political scientists engaged with Kahn’s scenario-based approach (Groom, 
1969; Hurley, 1968; Levy, 1970; Ritchie-Calder, 1968), but by the 1980s scenarios scarcely 
featured in politics literature, being consigned instead to the realm of management and the 
broader field of ‘future studies’.  Why then did area studies scholars begin to re-engage with 
scenarios in the early 1990s? A key reason seems to have been a collective bout of 
questioning with regard to conventional approaches to forecasting, brought to a head by 
the largely unanticipated and revolutionary changes of the collapse of the Soviet empire and 
the end of the Cold War (Cox, 1998; Doran, 1999; Feder, 2002: 114; Seliktar, 2004).  
The most conventional of approaches to forecasting had long been to simply ask an expert. 
However, although they may be related qualities, expertise, wisdom, foresight, and 
perspective do not always overlap. Expertise may be narrow and focused, overemphasising 
some factors, underplaying others, and so producing forecasts ill-suited to complex political 
processes at the country level. One response to the fallibility of the expert in prediction 
during the Cold War had been the Delphi method, which sought to mitigate the biases and 
blind-spots of individuals by using a large number of experts in an iterative process. The 
chief flaw in such a process was its inevitable tendency towards the middle point, with the 
more radical voices tamed by the majority (Schwartz, 2002: 18). Against the background of 
the end of the Cold War, methods which suffocated outlying forecasts under a blanket of 
more conventional, continuity-based approaches did not represent the answer. Against this 
background too, experts who had built forecasts around the metanarratives of historical 
development found themselves likewise out of step with events; the assumption of the 
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eventual triumph of the socialist worldview seemed notably unsuitable, but so too did 
established paradigms on the right concerning the impossibility of reform within the Soviet 
system (Seliktar, 2004). Mathematical modelling, which had benefited from the 
development of computers capable of data-rich and complex models, sought to cope with 
the discontinuities of the socio-political world with some success using rational-choice 
based approaches to specific problems (Stokman and Thomson, 1998). However, as noted 
earlier, broader, area studies forecasts of the ‘whither China?’ type are more problematic 
from the perspective of theoretical modelling.  
As scholars in the social sciences began to reconsider approaches to forecasting (Cooper and 
Layard, 2002; Cox, 1998; Doran, 1999; Flyvbjerg, 2001; Hwang and Kugler, 1998; James, 
1995; Kuran, 1995; Lipset and Bence, 1994), the scenario method appeared to offer a 
solution to these problems, promoting consideration of a range of options, from linear 
continuity to disparate discontinuities. They challenged metanarratives and paradigmatic 
conservatism by insisting on the telling of a range of different stories. They seemed to have 
an appropriate methodological rigour, with scenarios worked out in the light of key drivers, 
and often in consultation with a group of experts. What is more, in their use in the world of 
business – most famously at the oil company, Shell – they appeared to have succeeded in 
anticipating such phenomena as the oil price shock of 1974 and the end of the Cold War; 
something apparently beyond most academic experts (Cornelius et al., 2005: 98; Schwartz, 
2002: 22-23; Yergin and Gustafson, 1993: 11). Finally, and slightly more disingenuously, 
multiple scenarios reduced the possibility of scholars being wrong. Coupled with the 
constant clarification that scenarios are not predictions, they provided experts with a 
degree of reputational security, and with it a desirable liberty in future-oriented writing. 
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Before considering the use of the scenario approach against its own criteria and in the light 
of the broader literature on the relationship between political science and forecasting, let us 
briefly set out its essential elements. The first and, from the point of view of the argument 
here, the most significant element of the scenario approach is that it is self-avowedly not 
predictive. Repeatedly scenario-based accounts assert, in the language of one of the most 
well-known exponents of the technique, that ‘scenarios are not projections, predictions or 
preferences: rather they are coherent and credible alternative stories about the future’ 
(Cornelius et al., 2005: 93). Their objective does not consist of deciding which scenario is 
likely to be correct in order to plan for it, but rather of helping to prepare for a range of 
alternative futures, embracing uncertainty and providing ‘a language for talking about the 
future’ (Yergin and Gustafson, 1993: 12). Peter Schwartz, perhaps the foremost practitioner 
of the scenario method, talks about anticipation, rather than prediction, of future events. In 
short, the scenario approach argues that since we cannot reliably predict, then anticipating 
widely, on the basis of solid research, offers a powerful tool for dealing with possible futures 
(Schwartz, 2002: 26).  
The common reference within the scenario literature to stories and narratives draws 
attention to a focus on causal processes and potential turning points. Scenarios commonly 
identify key drivers, and imagine the impact of a range of uncertainties in relation to them. 
In doing so, the standard range of scenarios does not differ much from that established by 
Kahn in the 1960s: relative continuity, less linear but important variants, and ‘the 
unthinkable’ – or ‘way out’ – scenarios. The standard application of the scenario approach 
to future political developments involves establishing between three and five scenarios, 
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with the paths to these outcomes set out on the basis of the actions of or developments in 
identified key drivers. Table One provides examples of the range of scenarios arrived at in 
future-oriented political research. 
 
Table One. Examples of scenarios in relation to particular areas 
Area Source Scenarios 
Japan, the 
United States 
and the Asia-
Pacific 
Cronin, 1992 1. constructive globalisation of Japan 
2. heightened economic rivalry in Asia 
3. Japan-dominated Asia-Pacific region 
Russia Yergin and Gustafson, 
1993 
1. Muddling down (continuity) 
2. Two-Headed Eagle (centrist) 
3. Time of Troubles (chaos and reaction) 
4. Russian Bear (military dictatorship) 
5. ‘Chudo’ (economic miracle) 
Korea Pollack and Lee, 1999 1. integration and peaceful unification 
2. collapse and absorption 
3. unification through conflict 
4. disequilibrium and potential external 
intervention 
China Ogilvy et al., 2000 1. China Web (decentralisation) 
2. the New Mandarins (family/clan networks 
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in control) 
3. the Thief of Beijing (military dictatorship) 
European 
Union 
Bertrand et al. 2000 1. triumphant markets 
2. turbulent neighbourhoods 
3. the hundred flowers (flourishing national 
identities) 
4. shared responsibilities 
5. creative societies 
Israeli-
Palestinian 
Relations 
Sylvan et al., 2004 1. two-state solution 
2. negotiated agreement, status quo plus 
territoriality, and Palestinian autonomy 
3. no negotiated settlement, status quo 
territory, and Palestinian independence 
4. no negotiated settlement, territorial status 
quo, Palestinian autonomy 
5. no negotiated settlement, status quo plus 
territoriality, Palestinian autonomy 
 
Critiquing scenarios 
Having set out the attractiveness of scenarios to future-oriented scholars and analysts, 
established the growth of this particular method from the 1990s onwards, and outlined the 
approach’s central features, I turn now to a critique of the use of scenarios from the 
perspective of their own criteria, before concluding by returning to the wider questions 
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surrounding the relationship between social science and forecasting discussed in the first 
part of this article.  
In terms of its own criteria, the scenario approach clearly has strengths; however, despite its 
wide use, its appropriateness for scholarly discussion of potential futures has rarely been 
critiqued. It is not my purpose in this paper to criticise the effective use of scenario planning 
in the business world (Ringland, 2006), or its appropriate extension to policy-making (Ogilvy, 
2002). Scenario planning in this sense refers to a structured, facilitated, and normative 
process which identifies a problem – such as the future strategy of a company or a 
government –, develops potential scenarios, and then works out appropriate and desirable 
responses to these alternative futures to be taken by the participants’ company, 
government, and so on. When adopted by area studies scholars and analysts, however, the 
scenario framework and terminology are employed, but absent a specifically identified 
problem, provision for facilitated development, or context for delivering a normative 
response. Stanley Feder argues that scenarios could usefully be employed more in political 
science, but from the perspective of students sharpening critical thinking; in other respects 
he likewise favours the use of scenarios in planning (Feder, 2002: 121). 
Any critique of the scenario approach in area studies forecasting must early and squarely 
consider its central claim, that scenarios are not predictions but rather anticipations of 
alternative futures. Such a claim would seem to make it difficult to employ the most obvious 
criticism of future-oriented analysis, namely, that the predictions of the analyst turned out 
to be wrong. However, it is not unusual for advocates of the scenario approach to treat 
‘correct’ scenarios as successful predictions to be lauded. Indeed, returning to the 
widespread adoption of scenario planning by scholars in the early 1990s, one of the reasons 
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often cited for this was that the scholarly community had apparently failed to foresee the 
end of the Cold War, whereas scenario planners had done so (McCorduck and Ramsey, 
1997: v; Schwartz, 2002: 23; Yergin and Gustafson, 1993: 11). The scenario planning team 
from Shell themselves, having emphasised that scenario planning ‘differs fundamentally 
from forecasting in that it accepts uncertainty’, then proceed to celebrate the ‘legendary 
example[s]’ of their team in anticipating major changes such as the oil price shock of the 
1970s, European integration, and the collapse of the Soviet Union (Cornelius et al., 2005: 94, 
98). Scenarios are often treated as successful predictions, despite the fact that by definition 
the number of ‘wrong’ scenarios must outweigh the number of ‘correct’ scenarios. Of 
course, one must respect the insistence of scenario developers that ‘the test of good 
scenario planning is not whether the scenario accurately predicts the future’, since in a 
formal scenario development setting the intention is to use the process to enhance 
decision-making amongst those engaged in that process (Ogilvy, 2002: 9). Such though is 
rarely the case within the academic literature which is the focus of this paper.  
Related to this question of the predictive role of scenarios is their utility to policy makers. I 
have argued that one of the key reasons for scholars to engage with forecasting is to 
respond to the expectation from policy-makers that our expertise can provide valuable 
insight into potential futures. The often stated view that scenarios represent a more useful 
tool in this endeavour than do conventional forecasts is worthy of challenge. The foreword 
of Yergin and Gustafson’s Russia 2010 illustrates the point. 
‘Which future will it be? ... Whatever the outcome, Russia 2010 provides us with the 
signposts for the future and decreases the likelihood that we will be surprised by the 
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direction of events in that critically important part of the world’ (Yergin and 
Gustafson, 1993: xviii).  
It is a strange signpost that stands at a crossroads and tells the traveller that all four 
directions are the way to go. Too many alternatives might as easily be said to obscure as to 
illuminate the path ahead as the potential variables, rates of change, preferences, and 
conjectured discontinuities multiply (Miller, 2007: 345). From the perspective of social 
scientists engaging with possible futures, the provision of a set of alternative options, 
coupled with the scenario method’s insistence that it not be concerned with deciding which 
is the more likely, serves to undermine their accumulated expertise. As a reviewer of Buzan 
et al.’s The European security order recast: scenarios for the post-Cold War era (1990) had it, 
the authors’ ‘failure to take a solid position on the central question ... detracts from their 
analysis’ (Krause, 1991: 438). 
Much of the merit of the scenario approach lies not so much in its output but in the process 
of developing scenarios. The standard methodology employed by experts in scenario 
planning includes several days of workshops, where those with a stake in the identified 
problem develop the outline scenarios and identify the key drivers, before a smaller group 
draws up well-researched narratives, which are then brought back to the whole group so 
that appropriate strategies can be agreed to meet the various feasible futures (Ogilvy, 2002: 
176). This process must result in an increased understanding and detailed knowledge of the 
problem at hand for all involved. However, the use of the scenario approach in published 
academic work removes many of the advantages of process engagement and delivers 
instead the product of the process – often undertaken by one or two isolated experts with 
no direct role in ‘solving’ the ‘problem’ – to an external reader. Furthermore, this ‘product’, 
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particularly in the form of the scenario narratives, proves to be an inflexible output unsuited 
to the very complexity and interconnectedness of the world with which the scenario 
approach claims to deal. Each scenario is constructed on the basis of the behaviour of key 
drivers and actors, and a narrative is written which sets out the scenario in question – 
sometimes in the style of ‘history from the future’, complete with fictional names and 
specific imagined events (European Commission Forward Studies Unit, 1998b; Ogilvy et al., 
2000; Yergin and Gustafson, 1993). The tying of the behaviour of key drivers to particular 
scenarios creates inflexibility, presuming that a driver behaving in one particular way must 
lead to the scenario in question. In effect the scenarios are silos; once built they do not 
interact with other scenarios. 
A recent example illustrates: Andrew Kuchins’ book Alternative Futures for Russia to 2017 
(2007) contains a number of startlingly accurate anticipations of events which have since 
happened, notably the forced removal of the Mayor of Moscow from office faced with 
allegations of corruption, the extension of the presidential term, and a resurgence of 
terrorist attacks in Moscow, instigated from the North Caucasus. The difficulty with each of 
these is that they are placed in the ‘wrong’ scenarios, with each one occurring in scenario 
narratives based around the collapse of the Putin regime. Without getting tied down in the 
detail – and to be fair to Kuchins, we have not yet reached 2017 and so which scenario most 
closely represents reality remains a relatively open question – there is a methodological 
difficulty with the scenario approach in its anticipation that particular events and 
movements on the part of key drivers lead to particular scenarios. Its advocates argue that it 
is possible to look for early indicators, movements in relation to the key drivers, which point 
in the direction of a particular scenario developing (Ogilvy et al., 2000: 148). In this way, the 
scenario method tends to tie specific happenings to a particular scenario. Positing that 
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happening X leads to scenario Y rather than to scenario Z represents the sort of 
conventional linear forecast, replete with oversimplified causal processes, which scenarios 
are ostensibly designed to avoid. 
Sylvan et al. (2004), in constructing scenarios for Israeli-Palestinian relations, recognised the 
methodological difficulty of developing scenarios along causal chains and so departed a little 
from standard scenario methodology precisely to address this problematic question of the 
causal relationship between variables (drivers) and outcomes (scenarios). Constructing a 
rule-based computer model including a range of causal ‘if-then’ possibilities enabled the 
authors to explore various combinations of possible movements in the key drivers. 
Nonetheless, when later returning to reflect on the process and its outcomes, the experts 
involved came to the conclusion that several faulty ‘if-then’ causal links had been included, 
argued that the process of developing scenarios had distorted their views, and rationalised 
descrepancies between real-world outcomes and scenarios using the same arguments that 
experts habitually employ in relation to forecasting errors (Sylvan et al., 2004). 
 
Conclusion 
My critique of the scenario approach according to its own criteria has argued that it has 
particular merit as a structured and facilitated process involving participants engaged in 
developing policy and strategy. However, readers of articles, reports, and books based 
around scenarios miss out on this process, where scenario planning’s central value lies. As a 
tool in the hands of scholars and experts then, the scenario approach has a number of 
difficulties. Its insistence that scenarios are not predictions is undermined by the scenario 
literature itself, reduces the usefulness of scenarios to policy-makers, and makes poor use of 
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the expertise available. The scenarios themselves tend towards inflexibility, creating ‘silo 
scenarios’ with no interaction between them, and reducing complex causal processes to a 
limited set of narratives. 
The concluding section of this paper considers the scenario approach in the light of 
forecasting in the social sciences. From the perspective of social scientists engaging with 
future-oriented research, scenarios formally represent a step back from the idea that 
prediction is possible. They start from the premise that ‘predictive forecasting is almost 
impossible where the problem forces us to deal with complex interactions of 
incommensurate driving forces and events’ (Schwartz, 2002: 22). Assuming this to be the 
case, then they believe that the best we can hope for is to anticipate a range of future 
possibilities. In the business and policy world in particular, covering the broad range of 
potential futures in order to at least conceptualise the coming years makes some sense. 
However, the scenario approach downplays the achievements of the social science 
disciplines from both sides of the positivist and interpretivist debate. For the positivist, the 
insistence that we cannot accurately forecast, and so must treat equally a range of potential 
outcomes, gives too little weight to broader predictive theories and models, such as 
democratic peace theory, power cycle theory, and the expected utility model, to name but 
three approaches whose predictive rigour has been tested in the literature and found to be 
effective (Bueno de Mesquita, 1998; Collins, 1995; Doran, 1999; Ray and Russett, 1996; 
Taagepera and Shugart, 1993). 
For the interpretivist, for whom insistence on the unpredictability of human affairs and the 
impossibility of theory-based prediction represents an attractive component of the scenario 
approach, the scenario methodology mandates too inflexible a process and product, 
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building a set of discrete scenarios with little scope for interaction between them. A series 
of fictional, albeit feasible, comparative cases results, structured according to the classical 
comparative politics approach, beginning with differences in outcomes and positing 
independent variables as the explanatory factors (Tarrow, 2010: 238). Causality represents a 
complex enough problem in comparative politics when dealing with known outcomes, 
where the difficulties of ensuring observation of all relevant variables, identifying the 
differences between them, and demonstrating causality are familiar. The scenario approach 
seeks to ‘read back’ the causal process not from one but from a plurality of imagined 
outcomes. As noted earlier, the complexity of analytical assumptions means that even 
identifying potential changes in the actions of key variables provides little useful insight with 
regard to their causal effect, in the sense of which broad scenario would result from which 
action. In some cases these narratives contain a degree of imagined detail which, although 
understandable as a device for developing strategic responses in a facilitated scenario 
planning process, implies a level of insight not justified by the methodology used (European 
Commission Forward Studies Unit, 1998b; Ogilvy et al., 2000; Yergin and Gustafson, 1993). 
Finally, if unspoken paradigms hindered forecasters of the Cold War years from ‘thinking the 
unthinkable’, and so blinded them to the possibilities of the radical change which in fact 
occurred in 1989-91, then the scenarios themselves have a paradigm which obstructs our 
view of potential futures; it is that the unlikely should be considered as of equal weight as 
the likely.  
The scenario approach places future-oriented research, analysis, and accumulated 
knowledge within a bounded methodology which drives the process of anticipating future 
developments along predetermined paths into a standardised range of options, paying too 
scant attention to the paths preferred by the theoretical and contextual understandings 
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available within the relevant scholarly disciplines. Within this critical summary of the 
scenario approach from the perspective of the political scientist, two broad conclusions can 
be drawn. First, and most straightforwardly, scenarios are an appropriate tool for problem-
based policy analysis rather than political analysis per se. Encouraged perhaps by the 
increasing demand from funders and  policy-makers for research to have a policy impact, 
scholars, most notably in the field of area studies, in the post Cold War decades have used 
scenario development as a readily accessible framework within which to indicate the 
potential policy implications of their research findings. The adoption of scenarios as the 
method of choice for future-oriented academic research has too often been accompanied 
by a failure to engage with the methodological implications of scenario analysis from a 
social scientific perspective. Second, the use of scenarios undermines both the individual 
expertise of scholars and the theoretical advances in their disciplines by insisting on an 
overtly non-predictive stance which emphasises the possibility of all feasible outcomes. Area 
studies scholars, however, combine a contextual understanding of their area with 
disciplinary expertise in the social sciences, including political science. Such awareness of 
the predictive possibilities of social science, coupled with the interpretivist approach of the 
area specialist, offers a way forward for a more assertive, and risky, future-oriented analysis, 
moving beyond the standardised framework of multiple scenarios and towards 
appropriately bounded predictions of likely political outcomes. 
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